


I.O. - 9614



The All-China Labour Federation to the All-India Trade Union Congress.

Dear Comrades!

The All-China Labour Federation sends comradely fraternal greetings to the toiling masses of India and wishes the Ninth All-India Trade Union Congress success. We wish your Congress the greatest success in its endeavour to express and define a revolutionary programme of action and to rally the rebellious working class and peasant masses for the struggles against exploitation and oppression.

The All-China Labour Federation is well aware of the enormous difficulties which are confronting your struggles for higher wages, shorter work-day etc. We are well aware, likewise, of the trials you must undergo in the course of your arduous fight to overthrow foreign domination, to crush the rule of British imperialism, and to attain complete national independence and the liberation of the Indian working masses from Subjugation and humiliation. All this we comprehend fully, because we are in the very midst of such a struggle. The Chinese working class and peasant masses are fighting a life-and-death struggle against the combined counter-revolutionary forces - the imperialists and the Kuomintang. The masses under the leadership of the All-China Labour Federation are determined to drive out from China the British, Japanese, American and French imperialists, and to overthrow the Kuomintang and the Nanking Government, the running dogs of the imperialists and the traitors to the Chinese revolution. Thus notwithstanding the raging white terror of the Kuomintang, the systematic and most ruthless mass executions and massacres of revolutionary workers and peasants, strikes and political mass demonstrations of ever-increasing dimensions are frequently taking place. Last but not least, the mass uprisings of the peasants are spreading all over the country and large sections of Southern China are already governed by the Soviets, established and controlled by the local revolutionary workers, peasants and Red Army soldiers.

Of course, not only our own and your struggles but also the revolutionary movements of all other colonial and semi-colonial peoples, and that of the workers and peasants in particular, will be greatly accelerated as soon as a revolutionary united mass front of all the oppressed and exploited against the capitalists and landlords, the militarists and imperialists as well as ~~the~~ working class traitors will be set up and co-ordinated. The oppressed and exploited masses of all countries, nationalities and races must realise once and for all that a united front with, or the leadership of such people as the MacDonalds, Purcells, Citrines, Bunji Suzukis, Chiang Kai-Sheks, Nehrus etc. inevitably lead the workers' and peasants' movements to the most crushing defeats. It is therefore, essential to expose before the masses the treacherous policies and activities of these people and eliminate them without fail from our class organisations. Unless such traitors are discarded and their reformist policies repudiated national independence in India or elsewhere is not attainable and the emancipation of the working class and peasant masses is impossible.

Hence with profound appreciation we learned the fact that the restless and rebellious masses of your country are in deep sympathy with Soviet Russia and its aspirations; that your Trade Union Congress took steps in the promotion of a revolutionary united front and trade union unity on the Pacific by selecting delegates to attend the Pan-Pacific Trade Union

Conference in our country last year, and that it had condemned the British government in refusing passports to the delegates. The All-China Labour Federation followed with the greatest sympathy the determined fight of the Bombay Textile Workers in their strike, the brave struggles of the Railway and the Steel Workers; the boycott of the Simon Commission as well as the militant action taken by your delegates at the so-called "Commonwealth Labour Conference" at London and the Brussels Congress of the Second International. We rejoiced at their walking out of these social-imperialists gatherings which not only called upon the workers to pursue the so-called industrial peace policy "Mondism" but even went on record in opposition to national independence for India and other colonies, as well as most viciously attacking Soviet Russia, the only real friend of the colonial peoples and the stronghold of the world proletariat. Obviously the words uttered by your delegate, Chaman Lal, that "the British Labour Party, together with the Second International, are the advance guard of British and European imperialism in order to prevent and postpone the emancipation of the colonial Peoples" are strikingly true and marvelous words which your Congress and all of us should take due notice of.

However, at the same time we learn with regret that many of your Trade Union Congress leaders have joined hands with the treacherous leaders of the British Labour Party, the General Council of the British Trade Union Congress, the Second International and its tail-end the Amsterdam International (International Federation of Trade Unions with headquarters at Amsterdam). Indeed we were astonished to read in your official publication the urging by Mr. N.M. Joshi, General Secretary of your Trade Union Congress to the effect that the All-India Trade Union Congress should join the Amsterdam International, the systematic splitter of the world trade union movement and the most persistent saboteur of all efforts by the Trade Unions of Soviet Russia and the Red International of Labour Unions (with headquarters at Moscow) to bring about trade union unity the world over. We read with deep disgust your secretary's call to join and strengthen the Amsterdam International, the most cunning disrupter of mass strikes, liberation movement uprisings and the upholder of the counter revolution in China. Not less outrageous and treacherous is the proposal of Mr. Joshi that the All-India Trade Union Congress in co-operation with Bunji Suzuki, Matsuoaka, Yonekubu & Co., the Japanese champions of the Amsterdam International and the bought agents of Japanese imperialism should through the so-called Geneva Labour Office convene an "Asiatic Labour Conference" thus purposely ignoring and undermining the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, established at the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference last year as previously referred to, and composed of the Trade Unions of Soviet Russia, Australia, Indonesia, China, the Philippines, Korea, and the Left Wing Trade Unions of Japan, England, France, America and Canada. Yes, consciously and deliberately, Joshi, Bunji Suzuki & Co, are striving to disrupt the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress to be convened by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat in the summer of 1929.

Evidently Mr. Joshi and his like are preparing to betray your Trade Union Congress as Mr. Nehru and his like did it recently in your national independence movement or, as was the case with the Chiang Kai-Sheks in our country last year, The betrayal in our country took place as soon as the workers and peasants became class conscious and were fighting not only the foreign invader imperialists but the native exploiters as well. In other words, as soon as the Chinese revolutionary masses established the eight hour day, confiscated and redistributed the land, set up the workers' and Peasants' government, etc., the bourgeoisie, feudalists, militarists, social-reformists and weak

kneed leaders of every description deserted the revolution and went over to the camp of the counter revolution and white terror. We presume that your revolutionary movement is rapidly approaching a somewhat similar stage of development.

The All-China Labour Federation hopes that the All-India Trade Union Congress in session, and the local unions, or the rank and file in particular, will not follow the footsteps of Joshi & Co., but will formulate and promulgate fighting policies, and grasp out out-stretched hand for a revolutionary united mass front under the leadership of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. We sincerely hope that your Congress will not endorse social-imperialism nor join the Amsterdam International and thus permit the Joshis to throw the weight of your trade unions on the side of the bourgeoisie and its running dogs, the reformists and traitors. On the contrary, we hope that your trade unions will rather strengthen their connections and bonds with the trade unions of Soviet Russia and the Far-East, and that we will meet your representatives at the coming Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress. We urge and call upon you to join hands with us in order to fight more effectively imperialism and the threatening imperialist war, to defend jointly Soviet Russia and with an increasing energy to foster the fight for the liberation of the oppressed colonial peoples and victory for the working class.

In conclusion the All-China Labour Federation extends to your Trade Union Congress a cordial invitation to pay a visit to our country and to be an eye witness to the brutal massacres of our comrades by the Kuomintang, the component part and friend of the Amsterdam and Second Internationals; to learn from the most authentic source the character and driving forces of the great Chinese revolution as well as to exchange with us views and revolutionary experiences.

Down With Imperialism and Its Running Dogs!

Long Live the Revolutionary United Mass Front of

All Oppressed and Exploited.

All-China Labour Federation,

Son-Chao-Jen, Chairman,

Lou-Tan-hsian, Secretary,

Shanghai, October 10, 1928.



In the imperialist war for the oppression of the colonies, the main tasks of the international proletariat are, a) to propagate in the imperialist armies a defeatist attitude; b) to organise national minority armies and lead them in a revolutionary manner; c) to propagate fraternisation between the soldiers in the imperialist armies and the soldiers in the revolutionary armies in the colonies; d) to turn the war for the suppression of the colonies into civil war; e) to fight against such slogans as the defence of the fatherland, the protection of citizens abroad, and the solution of the problem of over-population; f) to oppose the sending of gun-boats and the transportation of imperialist troops to the colonies, the increasing of the war budget and the extension of the term of military service, etc; g) to send capable Party members to the imperialist armies ~~to help them to the war~~ and navies in the colonies to do organisation and propaganda work, and to send comrades to brother parties in the colonies to help them to do anti-imperialist work in the armies. The work must be connected with the national revolutionary movements in the colonies; h) if there are troops recruited from colonial peoples in the imperialist army such as Indians, Annamites, African Negroes, Party members from such colonial countries should be appointed to work among such troops; i) work among the sailors in the navy should be intensified by the different parties. This work will not only help the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries, but it will be of great importance to the fight against war directed against the Soviet Union and suppression of colonial revolution; j) to oppose the supply of ammunition, technicians, and advisers to the counter-revolutionary armies in the colonies; k) to oppose the imperialist intervention in the civil wars in the colonies and the granting of loans by the imperialist ~~governments~~ ~~governments~~ ~~governments~~ to the counter-revolutionary governments and militarists in the colonies; l) to fight against the imperialist military preparations in the concessions, railroads, and on the rivers in the colonies; m) to ~~fight~~ oppose the imperialist butchery in the colonies and all the measures which the imperialists adopt for helping the native counter-revolutionary governments to suppress the masses.

In the war among the imperialists for the exploitation of the colonies, the following methods in addition to the above-mentioned must be used: a) to turn the war among the imperialists for the exploitation of the colonies into a civil war, and to work for the defeat of all the imperialist powers engaged in the war; b) to oppose the assistance of the native militarist groups engaged in a war among themselves by the imperialists; c) to oppose all imperialist militarist preparations in the colonies before the breaking out of the war. Apart from this, application can be made of the general tasks both before and after the breaking out of imperialist wars.

In regard to the preparations for civil war, a new point should be added to the four points suggested in the theses. Military organisation and training occupies an exceptionally important place in the proletarian masses in the colonial countries and countries with a mercenary army. Although the proletariat has learned a lot of military technique ~~in the imperialist~~ ~~in the imperialist~~ ~~in the imperialist~~ countries, yet the military technique of combating uprisings is quickly improving. Regarding our tactics during the insurrection, a new point should also be added. On

the one hand we have resolutely pointed out that as soon as the insurrection is started, we must firmly go forward with all our forces until our enemy is destroyed. On the other hand, we must point out that as soon as various symptoms of defeat have become visible, we should quickly and determinedly adopt a policy of retreat, in order to preserve the masses who participated in the insurrection and our weapons, to enable us to prepare for another attempt. During the July Insurrection in 1917, this, manoeuvre was very skilfully executed. But after the defeat of the Canton Insurrection, although a part of our military forces had safely retreated to the villages to lead the peasant struggles, yet a part of our forces was sacrificed on account of the lack of a plan for a systematic retreat. The Shanghai Uprising also suffered from similar mistakes.

The Chinese Revolution is a very good example of national wars. During the Chinese Revolution in 1925-27, the Chinese Communist Party led the Chinese proletariat to take part in the war for the unification of Kwangtung and the Northern Expedition, both of which were carried out under the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie. During both wars, the Chinese Communist Party made many opportunist errors, in the struggles against the Rightward movement of the bourgeoisie and the struggle for leadership of the revolution. These opportunist mistakes also affected our attitude towards the national wars. This is because although formally the war for unification of Kwangtung and the Northern Expedition are anti-militarist struggles in fact, objectively, they are primarily struggles which are bound to shake the foundation of imperialist rule in China. Thus with the support and assistance of the workers in the Hongkong Strike, the war for the unification of Kwangtung succeeded in dealing a severe blow to the British imperialists and forced them to carry out the 25% surtax proposal. With the support of the Wuhan workers and the active participation of the peasants of Hunan and Hupeh, the Northern Expedition succeeded in taking back the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang.

Because this civil war was revolutionary, was led by the proletariat, and participated in by the peasants, the objective task of the Chinese Communist Party should have been to establish our own class army, to extend the workers and peasant military organisations and training so as to assist the proletariat in ~~its~~ its struggle for the hegemony in the revolution. But the Chinese Communist Party had practically overlooked all these points. Although the objective conditions during the Northern Expedition were fairly good, yet the Party failed to utilise the political and military apparatus to carry out our own work in the army. And further, the Party never tried to create our own military force. Our Party had never realised that the mercenary character of the National Revolutionary Army was a source of danger and that the whole army could be easily turned into the tool of the militarists.

Our Party were chiefly engaged in political manoeuvres among the upper layer of the officers, and considered the making of alliances between generals ~~in~~ the centre of our work. The Party failed to take as the centre of our work the organisation and propaganda among the lower strata of the soldier masses and the ~~same~~ changing of the character of the army by introducing worker and peasant masses into the army. The Party did not sufficiently realise the revolutionary meaning of the arming of the workers and the peasants and their military training. The party also had failed to pay attention to the training of comrades for leading

military work. The Party had also failed to prepare for and lead the partisan warfare of the peasants, to take in hand the organisation of the scattered and therefore unsuccessful isolated peasant uprisings.

These mistakes can be considered as the chief sources of the military defeat of the proletariat in the Northern Expedition. Thus, when Wuhan followed Hankow and walked into the counter-revolutionary camp, our Party could only use the armies of Yeh Ting and Ho Lung to make a heroic protest (the Manchang uprising) at the moment of defeat, and was not able to go ~~in~~ a step forward and convert this protest into civil war for the overthrow of the political power of the bourgeoisie, the militarists and the gentry.

At the beginning we had about 15,000 soldiers in the armies of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. We had also soldiers' nuclei of the Party functioning fairly well and officers who are Party members. There were also armed workers and peasants who participated in the uprising. But although the aim of the Manchang Uprising was the outcome of the agrarian revolution, yet it has done practically nothing to promote the agrarian revolution. During the 50 days southward march of the revolutionary army from Manchang to Swatow, the regions through which we marched were never touched by the agrarian revolution. Thus this army not only failed to do positive work as a Workers and Peasants Army, but it even failed to achieve the results of a peasant partisan troop.

The army received correct leadership only after its defeat, when about over a thousand men of the remnants of Yeh Ting's troops joined the peasants of Hailufeng. From that time on, it began to play the proper role of the partisan troops and the Red Army. Another detachment of the same army of Yeh Ting had also about one thousand men. It was led by Chu Te and is now moving about the border of Kwantung, Hunan and Kiangsi. It was joined by the peasant detachment in those localities and forms a large partisan army, assisting the peasants in the agrarian revolution in southern Hunan, and in establishing many local Soviet powers in a large number of districts.

Another detachment of the National Revolutionary Army which came over to our side was the Officers' Training Corps in the Canton Uprising. This regiment has about a thousand men. After the defeat of the Canton Uprising it went to Hailufeng and joined the above-mentioned detachment.

All these forces combined made up the central cadre of the Red Army in Hailufeng. After the loss of the cities of Hailufeng, the Red Army was divided into partisan troop organisations, spreading its power in different directions and pushing on the tide of the agrarian revolution. Up to now these troops still form the most useful military organisations for carrying on the peasant uprisings in the eastern part of Kwantung.

Apart from the above mentioned comparatively large armed revolutionary bodies, there are many partisan troops in the Yangtse Kiang and Chu Kiang valleys which came to our side from the Kuomintang armies. These troops are spread over the Kwantung, Hunan, Kiangsi, Hupeh and Honan provinces and are assisting the peasant masses of these provinces in the agrarian revolution. There is another kind of the peasant armed forces which is formed by the peasants arming themselves with guns and other military weapons seized from the reactionary armies by the peasants. The most successful case of this kind is in the Hainan Island. There are about a thousand men, with a very good Party leadership and more centralized Red Army organisation. In many Chinese villages, the cases of the peasants attempting to seize the arms of the ~~xx~~ regular troops with only one or two rifles or with simply

primitive weapons are not infrequent.

The greatest shortcoming of the village partisan troops and the Red Army in the Soviet District is that although these troops themselves were formed under the leadership of the proletariat, yet the present leading capacity of the cities is still weak, the organization of the workers and their fighting capacity are not yet strong enough to lead the coordinated action of the cities and the villages. Hence these troops are still carrying on their struggle in the form of partisan warfare. Although they have established a number of local Soviets, they have not yet stirred up a high wave of civil war, shaken the regime of the reactionary bourgeoisie and imperialism in China.

Formerly we thought only the Parties in the Eastern countries have not paid sufficient attention to the work in the armies. But after hearing the reports and discussions at the Congress, we realize that even our brother Parties in the Western countries fail to devote enough time and energy to this important question. The experiences of the uprisings in China teach us that if we do not succeed in shaking the foundations of the imperialist army, our anti-war work will be mostly wasted and no successful results will be obtained.

There are two peculiarities in regard to the Chinese army that tend to make our work in the Chinese army much easier than in the armies of Western countries. First, the compact organization of the European and American armies and the comparatively better treatment afforded to the soldiers usually create great difficulties for those who carry on revolutionary activities in the army. But the situation is entirely different in China. Although the Chinese armies are mostly composed of slum-proletarians rather than proper workers, the standard of living of the soldiers are even lower than the poorest workers and peasants. According to the report of the Chief of Staff Ho Ying-chin of the Military Committee of the Nanking Government, there are 84 armies in China divided into 800 divisions, with a total of 2,200,000 men. The annual military expense is 720,000,000 dollars (mex). The armies of Chang Hsieh Liang and Yang Tsung-Hsin are not included in this report. But the possible annual income is only 400,000,000 dollars (mex). On account of this enormous discrepancy between the income and the expenses, most of the militarists have no means of meeting their army expenses. Thus the militarists are talking of cutting down the army. But, while thus talking, they are still carefully watching each other, preparing for possible conflicts.

Many militarists are, on the one hand, adopting the policy of not paying the soldiers and even of taking the money intended for the payment of the soldiers for their own use, and on the other hand, still recruiting more soldiers for the purpose of extending territory under their control. The result of this is naturally intensified warfare between the militarists, and the consequent increasing of the burden and suffering of the workers and the peasants, and also the life of the soldiers becomes more inhuman and unbearable. In the face of such contradictions, the life of the Chinese soldiers has no chance of being bettered. Their hunger and suffering are becoming more acute every day. The economic decline of the whole country, the bankruptcy in the villages, and the growing unemployment prevent the soldiers from finding a living outside of their miserable and dangerous occupation. Moreover, the deepening of the agrarian revolution and the spread of the slogans "Armed Uprising" and "Power to the Soviets" among the

worker and peasant masses are having a great influence on the soldiers. Thus the process of the class differentiation is developing rapidly in the army and it can be safely considered as an inevitable fact that the soldiers will come to the side of the revolution.

Secondly, such incorrect slogans as "Pacifism", "abolition of the standing army and the democratisation of the police", "the people's army", "curse the ~~the~~ red army", "return to the land", "refuse to shoot", "refuse to serve", and "to answer wars with strikes" are not yet prevalent among the Chinese workers, peasants and soldiers. On the contrary, the Chinese workers and peasant mass are consciously realising that without the overthrow of the Chinese native gentry, bourgeoisie and new militarists, there is no hope for peace. Only when the workers and peasants, ~~after receiving military~~ training and having a compact organisation annihilate the armed forces of our enemies, - from the so-called national revolutionary army to the village police, etc.- and, by means of strikes and armed uprisings, create a Red Army: only then can we hope for final victory and final peace.

After the defeat of the Canton Uprising, many workers of Kwantung voluntarily entered the army to carry on revolutionary work among the soldiers. The unemployed workers of many places voluntarily went to the village to lead the peasant uprisings. The defeated peasant masses whose uprising was crushed by the reactionary troops were going voluntarily to organise partisan troops which push forward the development of the agrarian revolution. At the same time, these movements of the peasants shook the reactionary armed forces themselves. It is not unusual that soldiers and village police come to join the village partisan troops.

From the point of view of mercenary armies of the imperialist countries, work among them is much more difficult than work in the conscript armies. But the mercenary armies of the colonial countries are quite different. Work among this kind of army is even easier than work among the conscript army in the imperialist countries. It is easier for the workers and peasants to enter the colonial mercenary army and to carry on revolutionary activity among them.

From the experience of our work in the armies, we feel that on the one hand, our brother Parties in the West should do their best to struggle against the incorrect tendencies in the proletarian masses concerning this question and on the other hand, they should intensify their work in the armies. The main points in this work are: a) To send systematically organised Party members and proletarian groups into the army (this is easier in countries where there are voluntary and mercenary armies); we must especially enter the strategical departments of the army; b) If we cannot become soldiers, we should apply for canteen work or odd jobs in the army which are particularly fit for propaganda work; c) Party nuclei and soldiers committees should be set up in the army; d) Much emphasis should be placed on creating and developing similar organisations in the navy; e) Propaganda and agitation in the army should be considered as continuous and everyday work; f) Struggle concerning the daily life of the soldiers should sometimes receive more attention than political struggles, because this is the best means for the soldiers to realise their own strength.

The slogan "For the People's Defensive Corps", can only be put forward in colonial countries where class differentiation has not yet developed and where the

revolutionary movement has not yet reached the stage of the democratic revolution. In countries where the revolution has already developed to the democratic stage, the slogan "For the people's Defensive Corps" would mean a support of the bourgeoisie, and should be dropped. Instead, slogans for the organisation of Red Guards and Peasant Defence Corps should be put forward. In countries where the revolution ~~is~~ has already passed from the democratic revolution to the proletarian stage, the slogan "For the People's Defence Corps" is even less applicable. Because in this period, when a dictatorship of the workers and peasants is in existence, or when the revolution is in a stage of transition to a dictatorship of the proletariat, the kind of military force that such government requires must be either the Red Workers and Peasants Army or the Red Army grown from the workers Red Guard and Peasants Defence Corps (or partisan troops).

The national revolutionary army of the Chinese bourgeoisie and new militarists has completely turned into a counter-revolutionary armed force. Our tactics towards it should be the same as our tactics toward the imperialist army. We must propagate defeatism among such armies, and in the process of their defeat we should absorb the revolutionary soldiers into our workers' and peasants' army. We cannot expect to turn the National Revolutionary Army as a whole into a revolutionary army.

In the thesis, we think we should make our fight against the imperialist partition of China a separate item, just as we did in the case of the imperialist manoeuvres against the Soviet Union.

In the face of Japanese military intervention in Shantung and Manchuria, the Nanking Government, on the one hand, prohibited the anti-Japanese movement of the masses, and, on the other hand, tries to stir up the United States of America against Japan, or if it is even making secret deals with Japan. Not only the worker and peasant masses are dissatisfied with this shameful attitude of the Nanking Government, but even the petty-bourgeoisie is showing signs of dissatisfaction. Thus the Left wing of the Kuomintang and the "Third Party" elements, both demand that the mass movement should be re-instituted under the leadership of the Kuomintang, so that they can use the mass movement in their bargain with the Japanese imperialists. At the same time, this manoeuvre tends to pacify the revolutionary fervour of the masses. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party is to participate actively in all anti-Japanese movements whenever it is a mass movement. The purpose of our participation is to unmask the Nanking Government's real policy of capitulation to the imperialists and to expose the treacherous manoeuvre of the "Third Party" elements to cheat the masses ~~and~~ by sham revolutionary demands. We must demonstrate to the masses that, under the reactionary government, the only way out for the masses is to conduct their own struggle against the Japanese ~~xxx~~ imperialists. To expect ~~xxxx~~ the reactionary government to re-instate mass movements is absolutely utopian and hopeless. We should link this propaganda up with the slogans for the armed uprising of the peasants, workers and poor people for the overthrow of the Kuomintang political power, for a thorough anti-imperialist movement and for the establishment of political power. In the Kuomintang armies we should intensify our propaganda and organisation work, because the Tsianan butchery and the anti-Japanese movement has also stirred up the soldier masses of the Kuomintang armies.

We must prepare for the inevitable situation when the war breaks out, and for fascist form of oppression. First, we must make our Party factory nuclei work half illegally even at the present time, so as to prepare for turning them into complete illegal organisations when the situation demands, secondly we must establish secret illegal Party nuclei in the army so as fundamentally to shake the foundations of the imperialist army.

File No. *109614*

(C.I.D.) Office Notes

September 26, 1928:

D. C. I.

Attached is a copy of the International Press Correspondence which is the official publication of the Communist organizations of the World. The price is \$12.00 per annum and I respectfully suggest that it be subscribed for as it contains a wealth of political information. I have also to suggest that the C.I.D. rent a P. O. Box the cost of which is \$10.00 a year exclusive of \$5.00 deposit as a guarantee for the return in good order of the keys. This would enable us to have the newspapers "Izvestia" and "Red Banner" delivered direct instead of to the private address of D.S. Ovsiannikoff as are the present arrangements. The P.O. Box would also be useful in communicating with doubtful advertisements which appear in the press and for other C. I. D. purposes of a confidential nature.

R. Robertson

*A & B very useful suggestion.
Approved. Expenses can be met
as usual from paper fund &
incidentals -*

*J.S.
Res?*

"A" ordered from Messrs Brewer & Co.
on September 27,

Sir, Reference "B" form attached
for signature *R. Robertson*

*P.O. Box 1344, rented in the name of
Henry Robertson #168 Hart Road, from
October 1, to June 30, 1929. Box to be cleared
by Robertson.*

POST OFFICE, SHANGHAI

Rules governing renting of Private Letter Boxes

1. Locked private boxes, into which all letters and postal packets other than insured letters and parcels will be sorted to be fetched by the addressee himself, may be rented at Post Office. The rent of the box assigned is to be paid half yearly or yearly in advance, and the box shall be closed if the rent for any period remains unpaid on the first day thereof. The rate of rent and the dimensions of the boxes may be obtained on inquiry at the District Accountancy.
 2. Every person who desires to rent a private box shall, in addition to any other fee payable, deposit a sum of \$5.00 as a guarantee for the return, in good order, of the keys of the box, which deposit shall be refunded on the keys being returned on the expiry of the tenancy of the box; otherwise the deposit shall be forfeited to provide for the cost of fitting a new lock to enable the box to be re-let.
 3. A key shall be supplied with each box, and additional keys, if required, may be obtained upon application in writing addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, District Accountancy, and on payment of a fee of 50 cents each, and must not be obtained elsewhere than from the Post Office. On a box-holder relinquishing the use of a box, he shall be required to return, at once, all keys supplied to him; otherwise his deposit shall be retained as provided above.
 4. If a box-holder who has rented a private box for a half-year or one year relinquishes the use of such box before the expiration of the period for which the fee has been paid, he shall, on return by him of all the keys of the box, be entitled to a refund of the fee paid for the period beyond the end of the quarter during which the box is relinquished.
 5. If a key be lost, information must at once be given to the Post Office and the remaining key or keys (if any) returned. When a new lock, for which a charge shall be made, will be fitted in the box, and a key-and, if required, an additional key or keys-supplied.
 6. A private box shall not be let to any person using a fictitious or assumed name.
 7. The tenancy of a private box may be cancelled at any time if there is reason to believe that the box:-
 - (a) has been used by the tenant for or in connection with any illegal, fraudulent, indecent, or immoral purpose; or
 - (b) is held, used, or controlled by a person who has been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty.
- When the tenancy of a box is so cancelled, no portion of the fee paid for renting the box shall be refunded.
8. Private boxes shall be let only on the conditions prescribed in these regulations, and upon any breach thereof permission for the use of the box may be at once withdrawn.
 9. Mail matter directed to a person or firm renting a private box, and mail matter directed to the number of a private box, will be deposited in the box, unless written notice is given to the contrary. Mail matter for persons addressed care of the holders of boxes can only be placed in private boxes when it is addressed to the number of the box.
 10. As the sorting, and consequently the delivery, of correspondence will be materially facilitated when it bears as a part of the address, the number of the box, private box-holders are to be requested to have the number of their private box prominently shown on their letter paper, invoices, and other forms used by them in communicating with their correspondents, together with a request that, when addressing mail matter to them, the number of the box be included in the address.

租用郵局信箱請願書

啓者茲

擬在上海郵務管理局租用信箱一具所有關於租

用信箱之各項規則均經明悉情願遵守

請願人（簽署姓名
及蓋章）

籍貫

住址

行號或公司名（蓋章及行號
主或經理簽名）

地址及電話號

保證人（簽名蓋章
及詳細地址）

備考（如有西文姓名
及地址可寫於此）

中華民國

年

月

日

租賃私用信箱者宜知之規則

一 凡預付必須之資費可向郵局租賃帶鎖之私用信箱惟須以設備此項信箱之郵局為限除保險儲蓄及包

裹外所有信函及郵件均由郵局分揀於該私用信箱之內由收件人親自提取關於此項信箱之詳細

情形及其尺寸可向上海郵務管理局會計處面詢

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上重配新鎖另發鑰匙一把如屬必需或發數把惟須收取配鎖之費用計銀洋伍圓

五 租用信箱概不向用假姓名或冒用姓名之人租賃

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十 凡信箱如違照本章內所載之規定方准租給如違犯該項規定立即撤銷租用該項信箱之權

十一 凡郵件交租私用信箱人之姓名或租用信箱商鋪之名稱者或書交信箱之號數者除另經書明毋庸

投入私用信箱等字樣不計外概行投存於各該私用信箱之內如郵件書明轉托租賃信箱之人轉交

他人者須將信箱之號數寫明方准置入該信箱之內

十二 如將信箱號碼書明作爲地址之一部分於郵件之分揀及投遞利便殊多故請租賃私用信箱之人於與人

往來通訊之信箋上發貨單上及所用他項之單式上將信箱之號數特爲顯明標註且加註聲明凡向

其書交郵件務須將私用信箱之號數一併列入地址之內

The following is the new programme of the Chinese Communist Party as drawn up by the Third International. Extract from Inprekorr No. 64 dated September 19, 1928.

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In the war among the imperialists for the exploitation of the colonies, the following methods in addition to the above-mentioned must be used: a) to turn the war among the imperialists for the exploitation of the colonies into a civil war, and to work for the defeat of all the imperialist powers engaged in the war; b) to oppose the assistance of the native militarist groups engaged in a war among themselves by the imperialists; c) to oppose all imperialist militarist preparations in the colonies before the breaking out of the war. Apart from this, application can be made of the general tasks both before and after the breaking out of imperialist wars.

In regard to the preparations for civil war, a new point should be added to the four points suggested in the theses. Military organisation and training occupies an exceptionally important place in the proletarian masses in the colonial countries and countries with a mercenary army. Although the proletariat has learned a lot of military technique in the imperialist countries, yet the military technique of combating uprisings is quickly improving. Regarding our tactics during the insurrection, a new point should also be added. On

the one hand we have resolutely pointed out that as soon as the insurrection is started, we must firmly go forward with all our forces until our enemy is destroyed. On the other hand, we must point out that as soon as various symptoms of defeat have become visible, we should quickly and determinedly adopt a policy of retreat, in order to preserve the masses who participated in the insurrection and our weapons, to enable us to prepare for another attempt. During the July Insurrection in 1917, this, manoeuvre was very skilfully executed. But after the defeat of the Canton Insurrection, although a part of our military forces had safely retreated to the villages to lead the peasant struggles, yet a part of our forces was sacrificed on account of the lack of a plan for a systematic retreat. The Shanghai Uprising also suffered from similar mistake.

The Chinese Revolution is a very good example of national ~~xxxxx~~ wars. During the Chinese Revolution in 1925-27 the Chinese Communist Party led the Chinese proletariat to take part in the war for the unification of Kwantung and the Northern Expedition, both of which were carried out under the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie. During both wars, the Chinese Communist Party made many opportunist errors, in the struggles against the Rightward movement of the bourgeoisie and the struggle for leadership of the revolution. These opportunist mistakes also affected our attitude towards the national wars. This is because although formally the war of unification of Kwantung and the Northern Expedition are Anti-militarist struggle in fact, objectively, they are primarily struggles which are bound to shake the foundation of imperialist rule in China. Thus with the support and assistance of the workers in the Hongkong Strike, the war for the unification of Kwangtung succeeded in dealing a severe blow to the British imperialists and forced them to carry out the 25% surtax proposal. With the support of the Wuhan workers and the active participation of the peasants of Hunan and Hupeh, the Northern Expedition succeeded in taking back the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang.

Because this civil war was revolutionary, was led by the proletariat, and participated in by the peasants, the objective task of the Chinese Communist Party should have been to establish our own class army, to extend the workers and peasant military organisations and training so as to assist the proletariat in its struggle for the hegemony in the revolution. But the Chinese Communist Party had practically overlooked all these points. Although the objective conditions during the Northern Expedition were fairly good, yet the Party failed to utilise the political and military apparatus to carry out our own work in the army. And further, the Party never tried to create our own military force. Our Party had never realised that the mercenary character of the National Revolutionary Army was a source of danger and that the whole army could be easily turned into the tool of the militarists.

Our Party were chiefly engaged in political manoeuvres among the upper layer of the officers, and considered the making of alliances between generals the centre of our work. The Party failed to take as the centre of our work the organisation and propaganda among the lower strata of the soldier masses and the changing of the character of the army by introducing worker and peasant masses into the army. The Party did not sufficiently realise the revolutionary meaning of the arming of the workers and the peasants and their military training. The Party also had failed to pay attention to the training of comrades for leading military work. The Party had also failed to prepare for and lead the ~~partisan~~ of the peasants, to take in hand the organisation of the scattered and therefore unsuccessful isolated peasant uprisings.

These mistakes can be considered as the chief of the military defeat of the proletariat in the Northern Expedition. Thus, when Wuhan followed Nanking and walked into the counter-revolutionary camp, our Party could only use the armies of Yeh Ting and Ho Lung to make a heroic protest (the Nanchang Uprising) at the moment of defeat, and was not able to go a step forward and convert this protest into civil war for the overthrow of the political power of the bourgeoisie, the militarists and the gentry.

At the beginning we had about 15,000 soldiers in the armies of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. We had also soldiers' nuclei of the Party functioning fairly well and officers who are Party members. There were also armed workers and peasants who participated in the uprising. But although the aim of the Nanchang Uprising was the outcome of the agrarian revolution, yet it has done practically nothing to promote the agrarian revolution. During the 50 days southward march of the revolutionary army from Nanchang to Szechow, the regions through which we marched were never touched by the agrarian revolution. Thus this army not only failed to do positive work as a Workers and Peasants Army, but it even failed to achieve the results of a peasant partisan troop.

The army received correct leadership only after its defeat, when about over a thousand men of the remnants of Yeh Ting's troops joined the peasants of Hailufeng. From that time on, it began to play the proper role of the partisan troops and the Red Army. Another detachment of the same army of Yeh Ting had also about one thousand men. It was led by Chu Te and is now moving about the border of Kwantung, Hunan and Kiangsi. It was joined by the peasant detachment in those localities and forms a large partisan army, assisting the peasants in the agrarian revolution in southern Hunan, and in establishing many local Soviet powers in a large number of districts.

Another detachment of the National Revolutionary Army which came over to our side was the Officers Training Corps in the Canton Uprising. This regiment has about a thousand men. After the defeat of the Canton Uprising it went to Hai Feng and joined the above-mentioned detachment.

All these forces combined made up the central cadre of the Red Army in Hailufeng. After the loss of the cities of Hailufeng, the Red Army was divided into partisan troop organisations, spreading its power in different directions and pushing on the tide of the agrarian revolution. Up to now these troops still form the most useful military organisations for carrying on the peasant uprisings in the eastern part of Kwantung.

Apart from the above mentioned comparatively large armed revolutionary bodies, there are many partisan troops in the Yangtse Kiang and Chu Kiang valleys which came to our side from the Kuomintang armies. These troops are spread over the Kwantung, Hunan, Kiangsi, Hupeh and Honan provinces and are assisting the peasant masses of these provinces in the agrarian revolution. There is another kind of the peasant armed forces which is formed by the peasants arming themselves with guns and other military weapons seized from the reactionary armies by the peasants. The most successful case of this kind is in the Hainan Island. There are about a thousand men, with a very good Party leadership and more centralised Red Army organisation. In many Chinese villages, the cases of the peasants attempting to seize the arms of the regular troops with only one or two rifles or with simply primitive weapons are not infrequent.

The greatest shortcoming of the village partisan troops and the Red Army in the Soviet District is that although these troops themselves were formed under the leadership of the proletariat, yet the present leading capacity of the cities is still weak, the organisation of the workers and their fighting capacity are not yet strong enough to lead the co-ordinated action of the cities and the villages. Hence these troops are still carrying on their struggle in the form of partisan warfare. Although they have established a number of local Soviets, they have not yet stirred up a high wave of civil war, shaken the regime of the reactionary bourgeoisie and imperialism in China.

Formerly we thought only the Parties in the Eastern countries have not paid sufficient attention to the work in the armies. But after hearing the reports and discussions at the Congress, we realise that even our brother Parties in the Western countries fail to devote enough time and energy to this important question. The experience of the uprisings in China teach us that if we do not succeed in shaking the foundations of the imperialist army, our anti-war work will be mostly wasted and no successful results will be obtained.

There are two peculiarities in regard to the Chinese Army that tend to make our work in the Chinese army much easier than in the armies of Western countries. First, the compact organisation of the European and American armies and the comparatively better treatment afforded to the soldiers usually create great difficulties for those who carry on revolutionary activities in the army. But the situation is entirely different in China. Although the Chinese armies are mostly composed of slum-proletarians rather than proper workers, the standard of living of the soldiers are even lower than the poorest workers and peasants. According to the report of the Chief of Staff Ho Ying Chin of the Military Committee of the Nanking Government, there are 84 armies in China divided into 800 divisions, with a total of 2,200,000 men. The annual military expense is 720,000,000 dollars (mex). The armies of Chang Hsieh Liang and Yang Tsung-Hsin are not included in this report. But the possible income is only 400,000,000 dollars (mex). On account of this enormous discrepancy between the income and the expenses, most of the militarists have no means of meeting their army expenses. Thus the militarists are talking of cutting down the army. But, while thus talking, they are still carefully watching each other, preparing for possible conflicts.

Many militarists are, on the one hand, adopting the policy of not paying the soldiers and even of taking the money intended for the payment of the soldiers for their own use, and on the other hand, still recruiting more soldiers for the purpose of extending territory under their control. The result of this is of extending territory under their control. The result of this is naturally intensified warfare between the militarists, and the ~~subsequent~~ increasing of the burden and suffering of the workers and the peasants, and also the life of the soldiers becomes more inhuman and unbearable. In the face of such contradictions, the life of the Chinese soldiers has no chance of being bettered. Their hunger and suffering are becoming more acute every day. The economic decline of the whole country, the bankruptcy in the villages, and the growing unemployment prevent the soldiers from finding a living outside of their miserable and dangerous occupation. Moreover, the deepening of the agrarian revolution and the spread of the slogans "Armed Uprising" and "Power to the Soviets" among the worker and peasant masses are having a great influence on the soldiers. Thus the process of the class differentiation is developing rapidly in the army and it can be safely considered as an inevitable fact that the soldiers will come to the side of the revolution.

Secondly, such incorrect slogans as "Pacifism", "abolition" of the standing army and the demon-ation of the police", "the people's army", "curse the red army", "return to the land", "refuse to shoot", "refuse to serve", and "to answer wars with strikes" are not yet prevalent among the Chinese workers, peasants and soldiers. On the contrary, the Chinese workers and peasant mass are consciously realising that without the overthrow of the Chinese native gentry, bourgeoisie and new militarists, there is no hope for peace. Only when the workers and peasants, after receiving military training and having a compact organisation annihilate the armed forces of our enemies, - from the so-called national revolutionary army to the village police, etc - and, by means of strikes and armed uprisings, create a Red Army: only then can we hope for final victory and final peace.

After the defeat of the Canton Uprising, many workers of Kwantung voluntarily entered the army to carry on revolutionary work among the soldiers. The unemployed workers of many places voluntarily went to the village to lead the peasant uprisings. The defeated peasant masses whose uprising was crushed by the reactionary troops were going voluntarily to organise partisan troops which push forward the development of the agrarian revolution. At the same time, these movements of the peasants shook the reactionary armed forces themselves. It is not unusual that soldiers and village police come to join the village partisan troops.

From the point of view of mercenary armies of the imperialist countries, work among them is much more difficult than work in the conscript armies. But the mercenary armies of the colonial countries are quite different. Work among this kind of army is even easier than work among the conscript army in the imperialist countries. It is easier for the workers and peasants to enter the colonial mercenary army and to carry on revolutionary activity among them.

From the experience of our work in the armies, we feel that on the one hand, our brother Parties in the West should do their best to struggle against the incorrect tendencies in the proletarian masses concerning this question and on the other hand, they should intensify their work in the armies. The main points in this work are: a) To send systematically organised Party members and proletarian groups into the army (this is easier in countries where there are voluntary and mercenary armies); we must especially enter the strategical departments of the army; b) If we cannot become soldiers, we should apply for canteen work or odd jobs in the army which are particularly fit for propaganda work; c) Party nuclei and soldiers committees should be set up in the army; d) Much emphasis should be placed on creating and developing similar organisations in the navy; e) Propaganda and agitation in the army should be considered as continuous and everyday work; f) Struggle concerning the daily life of the soldiers should sometimes receive more attention than political struggles, because this is the best means for the soldiers to realise their own strength.

The slogan "For the People's Defensive Corps" can only be put forward in colonial countries where class differentiation has not yet developed and where the revolutionary movement has not yet reached the stage of the democratic revolution. In countries where the revolution has already developed to the democratic stage, the slogan "For the people's Defensive Corps" would mean a support of the bourgeoisie, and should be dropped. Instead, slogans

for the organisation of Red Guards and Peasant Defence Corps should be put forward. In countries where the revolution has already passed from the democratic revolution to the proletarian stage, the slogan "For the People's Defence Corps", is even less applicable. Because in this period, when a dictatorship of the workers and peasants is in existence, or when the revolution is in a stage of transition to a dictatorship of the proletariat, the kind of military force that such government requires must be either the Red Workers and Peasants Army or the Red Army grown from the workers Red Guard and Peasants Defence Corps (or partisan troops).

The national revolutionary army of the Chinese bourgeoisie and new militarists has completely turned into a counter-revolutionary armed force. Our tactics toward it should be the same as our tactics toward the imperialist army. We must propagate defeatism among such armies, and in the process of their defeat we should absorb the revolutionary soldiers into our workers' and peasants' army. We cannot expect to turn the National Revolutionary Army as a whole into a revolutionary army.

In the thesis, we think we should make our fight against the imperialist partition of China a separate item, just as we did in the case of the imperialist manoeuvres against the Soviet Union.

In the face of Japanese military intervention in Shantung and Manchuria, the Nanking Government, on the one hand, prohibited the anti-Japanese movement of the masses, and, on the other hand, tries to stir up the United States of America against Japan, or if it even making secret deals with Japan. Not only the worker and peasant masses are dissatisfied with this shameful attitude of the Nanking Government, but even the petty-bourgeoisie is showing signs of dissatisfaction. Thus the Left Wing of the Kuomintang and the "Third Party" elements, both demand that the mass movement should be re-instated under the leadership of the Kuomintang, so that they can use the mass movement in their bargain with the Japanese imperialists. At the same time, this manoeuvre tends to pacify the revolutionary fervour of the masses. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party is to participate actively in all anti-Japanese movements whenever it is a mass movement. The purpose of our participation is to unmask the Nanking Government's real policy of capitulation to the imperialists and to expose the treacherous manoeuvre of the "Third Party" elements to cheat the masses by sham revolutionary demands. We must demonstrate to the masses that, under the reactionary government, the only way out for the masses is to conduct their own struggle against the Japanese imperialists. To expect the reactionary government to reinstate mass movements is absolutely Utopian and hopeless. We should link this propaganda up with the slogans for the armed uprising of the peasants, workers and poor people for the overthrow of the Kuomintang political power, for a thorough anti-imperialist movement and for the establishment of political power. In the Kuomintang armies we should intensify our propaganda and organisation work, because the Tsinan butchery and the anti-Japanese movement has also stirred up the soldier masses of the Kuomintang armies.

We must prepare for the inevitable situation when the war breaks out, and for Fascist form of oppression. First, we must make our Party factory nuclei work half illegally even at the present time, so as to prepare for turning them into complete illegal organisations when the situation demands. Secondly we must establish secret illegal party nuclei in the army so as fundamentally to shake the foundations of the imperialist army.

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In the imperialist war for the oppression of the colonies, the main tasks of the international proletariat are, a) to propagate in the imperialist armies a defeatist attitude; b) to organise national minority armies and lead them in a revolutionary manner; c) to propagate fraternisation between the soldiers in the imperialist armies and the soldiers in the revolutionary armies in the colonies; d) to turn the war for the suppression of the colonies into civil war; e) to fight against such slogans as the defence of the fatherland, the protection of citizens abroad, and the solution of the problem of over-population; f) to oppose the sending of gun-boats and the transportation of imperialist troops to the colonies, the increasing of the war budget and the extension of the term of military service, etc; g) to send capable party members to the imperialist armies and navies in the colonies to do organisation and propaganda work, and to send comrades to brother parties in the colonies to help them to do anti-imperialist work in the armies. This work must be connected with the national revolutionary movements in the colonies; h) if there are troops recruited from colonial peoples in the imperialist army such as Indians, Annamites African Negroes, Party members from such colonial countries should be appointed to work among such troops; i) work among the sailors in the navy should be intensified by the different parties. This work will not only help the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries, but it will be of great importance to the fight against war directed against the Soviet Union and suppression of colonial revolution; j) to oppose the supply of ammunition, technicians, and advisers to the counter-revolutionary armies in the colonies; k) to oppose the imperialist intervention in the civil wars in the colonies and the granting of loans by the imperialists to the counter-revolutionary governments and militarists in the colonies; l) to fight against the imperialist military preparations in the concessions, railroads, and on the rivers in the colonies; m) to oppose the imperialist butchery in the colonies and all the measures which the imperialists adopt for helping the native counter-revolutionary governments to suppress the masses.

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In regard to the preparations for civil war, a new point should be added to the four points suggested in the theses. Military organisation and training occupies an exceptionally important place in the proletarian masses in the colonial countries and countries with a mercenary army. Although the proletariat has learned a lot of military technique in the imperialist countries, yet the military technique of combating uprisings is quickly improving. Regarding our tactics during the insurrection, a new point should also be added. On